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Highlights
• Industry inefficiency is defined for cost constrained production environ-
ments;
• Industry prices are defined and the optimal industry configuration is de-
termined;
• The industry inefficiency indicator is decomposed into sources compo-
nents;
• An empirical application to Ontario energy data is presented;
• The empirical application shows how to use the methodology in order to
estimate the effect of changes in the regulation regime.
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Cost Constrained Industry Inefficiency
Antonio Peyrache*
July 8, 2015
Abstract
In this paper a definition of industry inefficiency in cost constrained
production environments is introduced. This definition uses the indirect
directional distance function and quantifies the inefficiency of the indus-
try in terms of the overall output loss, given the industry cost budget.
The industry inefficiency indicator is then decomposed into sources com-
ponents: reallocation inefficiency arising from sub-optimal configuration
of the industry; firm inefficiency arising from a failure to select optimal
input quantities (given the prevalent inputs prices); firm inefficiency due
to lack of best practices. The method is illustrated using data on Ontario
electricity distributors. These data show that lack of best practices is only
a minor component of the overall inefficiency of the industry (less than
10%), with reallocation inefficiency accounting for more than 75% of the
overall inefficiency of the system. An analysis based on counter-factual
input prices is conducted in order to illustrate how the model can be used
to estimate the effects of a change in the regulation regime.
Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Industry Inefficiency,
Indirect Directional Distance Function, Productivity, optimal configura-
tion.
*Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (CEPA), School of Economics, The Univer-
sity of Queensland, Australia (a.peyrache@uq.edu.au).
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Introduction.
In this paper a definition of industry inefficiency in cost constrained produc-
tion environments is introduced. The idea behind cost constrained production
is that firms or decision making units (DMU) are allocated a certain cost and
are supposed to produce as much output as possible with this given cost (this
implies optimizing when selecting input quantities). It is assumed that data on
the inputs, the prices of the inputs and the outputs produced by each firm in
a given industry are available. With such data, it is possible to determine the
overall cost budget of the industry by looking at the inputs used and the input
prices faced by each firm. The problem that the central planner (or a market)
now faces is how to allocate this overall budget across the different production
units (given a certain number of constraints) in order to maximize the overall
output. This problem corresponds to the implicit determination of the optimal
structure of the industry via the determination of the optimal number of firms
that should populate the industry and the optimal allocation of resources across
these firms. Once this optimization problem is solved, one is able to quantify
inefficiency in terms of the directional distance function (DDF), where ineffi-
ciency is measured in terms of the overall output loss due to different sources:
i) the inefficiency of the firms actually operating in the industry (lack of best
practice) and ii) the inefficiency arising from a sub-optimal configuration of the
industry.
To the best of our knowledge the first paper to address this issue explicitly
in a linear programming framework is due to Ray and Hu (1997). This contri-
bution introduced the basic model in a primal context, where only input and
output quantities are observed. Later on Lozano and Villa (2004) introduced
the centralized resource allocation model which uses the same idea (and it is in
fact a special case of Ray and Hu (1997) where the number of firms is fixed to
the observed one). Following these attempts a literature developed to accom-
modate alternative empirical settings (see Aparicio et al (2013), Aparicio and
Pastor (2012), Asmild et al (2009), Asmild et al (2012), Fang (2013), Fang and
Zhang (2008), Gimenez-Garcia et al (2007), Lotfi et al (2010), Lozano and Villa
(2004, 2005), Lozano et al (2004, 2009, 2011), Mar-Molinero et al (2012), Ray
(2007), Ray and Mukherjee (1998)). Ray et al (2008) extended the industry
efficiency model using a cost function approach with input prices varying across
locations.
The method introduced in this paper is illustrated using data on Ontario
electricity distributors. The data show that lack of best practices at the firm
level is only a minor component of the overall inefficiency of the industry (less
than 10%). The bulk of the industry inefficiency is accounted for by severe
deviations from the optimal configuration. In this empirical part a counter-
factual analysis is also provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the defi-
nition of firm technology and inefficiency. Section 2 extends these notions to
the industry level. Section 3 is dedicated to the empirical illustration. Finally
section 4 concludes.
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1 Firm Technology and Inefficiency
Consider an industry where x ∈ RN+ inputs produce y ∈ RM+ outputs. It
is assumed that data on inputs and outputs are available for a number K of
firms (k = 1, ...,K). The data can be collected into two matrices: an input
matrix X = [x1, . . . ,xK ]
′ and an output matrix Y = [y1, . . . ,yK ]
′, where the
observations relative to each firm are collected on the rows of these matrices.
The dataset is the collection of these matrices:
(X,Y) (1)
The data generated firm technology set (production set, or production possi-
bilities set) is given by the picece-wise linear envelop of the observations available
(Banker et al., 1984, 2005):
Ψ =
{
(x,y) : λX ≤ x′ , λY ≥ y′ ,
∑
k
λk = 1 , λ ≥ 0
}
(2)
This production set is built under the assumption that the technology sat-
isfies convexity and free disposability of inputs and outputs. The constraint on
the intensity vector
∑
λk = 1 means that the technology allows for variable
returns to scale (VRS). An equivalent representation of the technology is given
by the output sets, which are the collection of all producible outputs given a
certain input vector P (x) = {y : (x,y) ∈ Ψ} and can be represented in func-
tional form via the directional output distance function (DDF) (see Chambers
et al., 1996, 1998):
TE = D (x,y; gy) = sup
β
{β : (y + βgy) ∈ P (x)} (3)
The DDF provides a measure of technical efficiency (TE) or, more precisely,
of technical inefficiency because it represents the total loss in output due to
inefficient use of the inputs available to the firm (with respect to the benchmark
represented by technology (2)). This measure of inefficiency is expressed in
terms of the numeraire gy which is therefore assumed to be fixed across firms and
time periods (comparisons of technical inefficiency using different numeraires
would be equivalent to comparing apples with oranges). The function (3) can
also be interpreted as a shortage function, inasmuch it is a measure of total
output loss with respect to a potential output benchmark.
It is now interesting to consider an alternative representation of the technol-
ogy (2) which assumes availability of information on input prices in the form
of a row vector w ∈ RN+ . In this case, one may think of the production pos-
sibilities as the collection of all the possible output vectors which are feasible
when the cost budget is set at level C. This gives rise to the indirect output
sets IP (w/C) = {y : (x,y) ∈ Ψ , wx ≤ C} and their functional representation
via the indirect directional output distance function (IDDF):
CE = ID (w/C,y; gy) = sup
β
{β : (y + βgy) ∈ IP (w/C)} (4)
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This alternative measure of inefficiency involves the use of input prices and it
measures how much output production could be expanded, given that the overall
cost the firm is facing is given. Since the constraint here is the overall cost rather
than a specific input vector, this type of inefficiency has also been called cost
constrained inefficiency (see Färe and Grosskopf, 1994; Grosskopf et al., 1997).
It should be emphasized that, though the cost is constraining production, the
inefficiency measure is defined on the output side for a given numeraire gy. This
means that the quantities in equations (3) and (4) share the same underlying
numeraire and they can be compared. Invoking the duality theorem proved in
Färe and Primont (2006), it holds that ID (w/C,y; gy) ≥ D (x,y; gy), where
the difference between the two indicators is an allocative efficiency component,
interpreted as the loss in output due to the choice of a non-optimal input mix:
AE = ID (w/C,y; gy)−D (x,y; gy) (5)
The allocative inefficiency definition embedded in equation (5) determines
the quantity of output which is lost because the firm fails to choose the optimal
input mix given the prevailing input prices. Given the duality between the
direct and the indirect DDF, it is thus possible to decompose the firm level cost
constrained inefficiency (CE) into the two components defined in equations (5)
and (3):
CE = TE +AE (6)
The left hand side of this equation is a measure of the overall loss in output
for a firm operating at the specified cost level. The first component on the right
hand side attributes part of this inefficiency to a less than optimal use of the
given input vector; while the second component is a measure of loss in output
attributable to the firm failing to choose an optimal input vector.
2 Industry Technology and Inefficiency
The previous section introduced the main representation of the firm technology
set and the firm inefficiency. The purpose of this section is to extend these no-
tions to the industry level. For the purposes of this study the industry is defined
in terms of inputs and outputs homogeneity, so that all the firms operating in
the industry uses the same set of inputs to produce the same set of outputs. It
is assumed that any number of firms can operate in the industry (entry and exit
of firms is allowed) and all the firms in the industry (already operating in it or
potentially entrant) face the same technology set Ψ defined in equation (2); in
other words all the firms in the industry face the same production trade-offs.
Under these assumptions the industry technology set is defined as (see Peyrache,
2013):
ΨI = ∪+∞S=1
(
S∑
s=1
Ψ
)
(7)
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The summation in parentheses is a special case of the aggregation discussed
in Li and Ng (1995) and Zelenyuk (2006)1. It should be noted that, though
the firm technology set is convex, the industry technology set may show some
non-convexity. This non-convexity at the industry level arises because of the
indivisibility of the firm: only an integer number of firms can operate in the
industry (of course this non-convexity becomes less important as the number of
firms grows large). The set defined in (7) can be also written as follow:
ΨI =
{
(x,y) : λX ≤ x′ , λY ≥ y′ ,
∑
k
λk = S , λ ≥ 0 , S ∈ N
}
(8)
Contrary to definition (2), the intensity vector is now constrained to sum
up to the the integer number S which represents the number of firms operating
(actually or potentially) in the industry. Interestingly enough, this set collapses
to the firm technology set (2) when S = 1. The industry technology returns all
the possible input and output combinations which are feasible at the industry
level and it is an enlargement of the firm production set. Since the industry as
a whole is operating within a given cost budget, it is interesting to describe the
industry technology set in terms of the associated indirect output sets which
represent all the output combinations the industry is able to produce given
the overall cost budget available. It would be tempting to define the industry
indirect output sets as IPI (w/C) = {y : (x,y) ∈ ΨI , wx ≤ C} (note that this
definition uses the industry technology (7) rather than the firm technology (2) as
a benchmark). Unfortunately this definition would ignore the structure of prices
that the industry is facing. Observed industry inputs, outputs and cost can be
defined quite easily as the sum of inputs, outputs and costs across the firms
operating in the industry. In fact, the total output of the industry will be equal
to the sum of all the firm level outputs (Q =
∑
k yk) and, similarly, the industry
overall cost budget will be the sum of the firm level costs (CI =
∑
k Ck). On
the contrary (unless the law of one price applies in the inputs market) there
will be a heterogeneous variety of different input price vectors which segments
the inputs market and make the price vector faced by each firm different. In
this general case, it is not clear how to define an industry input price vector
and therefore it is not clear which input price vector to use in the definition
of the industry indirect DDF. Suppose that the inputs market is divided into
different segments and in each segment a particular input price vector prevails
(this embeds the law of one price as a special case). An example of a segmented
inputs market is when input prices vary across different geographical locations
within a nation or a macro region (this for example is the case considered in
the Multi-Location Minimum Cost model of Ray et al, 2008). Each firm, by
deciding in which segment of the market operate production, implicitly decides
what vector of input prices to face. The number of segments of the market
can be smaller, equal or larger than the number of firms actually operating in
1The reader should note that if the production set is non-convex, then
∑S
s=1 Ψ 6= SΨ. The
proof of this is in Li and Ng (1995). In the case of a convex production set the equality holds.
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the industry. In fact, the first two cases corresponds to a situation in which
every firm is facing a different input price vector or some of the firms share the
same input price vector. The last case corresponds to a situation in which there
are more price vectors than firms. Though it may seem an unlikely situation,
this case corresponds to a counter-factual analysis in which one considers not
only the price vectors that the firms are currently facing in the industry, but
also an additional number of price vectors that will drive the counter-factual
analysis. So, for example, one may be interested in assessing the potential
efficiency gains obtainable by the industry via a shift of production towards
locations where the industry is not currently operating. This counter-factual
analysis may be important when assessing if to open a new firm (an entrant) in
a segment of the inputs market where no other firms are operating yet. All in all,
what is important from a mathematical point of view is to distinguish and keep
separate theoretically the number of segments of the market from the number
of firms which actually operate in the industry. As noted by Ray et al (2008)
the location idea imposes an integer constraint to guarantee that the number
of firms operating in each location is an integer number. In other words, the
vector of prices at a specific location can be activated only if a firm is physically
there; and the number of firms at each location must be an integer number
(which is the reason for the integer constraint). Though the location idea is
a very attractive way of thinking of input price variation, it is not the only
possibility. Price variation will arise, for example, every time that there is price
discrimination, limited information on prices (or costly search) or information
is organized in networks (therefore belonging to a specific non-physical network
is what determines prices). Contrary to the location idea, in this case input
price variation is not linked to the presence of a firm in a specific location. This
means that, in this second case, at the industry level it is possible to choose any
combination of the observed input prices (irrespective of the number of firms).
In order to formalize these ideas, consider now a partition of the input vector
into two components of dimension N1 +N2 = N : x′ =
(
υ′ µ′
)
. Associated
to this partition of the input vector we consider two input price matrices Ω
and Π of dimension J ×N1 and P ×N2 respectively. The first component will
respond to the logic behind the location idea: in order to activate such a vector
of prices, a firm needs to operate in that segment of the market (J is the total
number of segments). The second component will not respond to such a logic: it
is possible to access a specific vector of prices in the second component without
necessarily activate any production in that specific segment of the market (for
example by becoming part of a network; P is the total number of alternative
prices). The indirect output set for the industry will include different constraints
for these different components:
IPI (Ω,Π, C) =
{ ∑
j yj :
(
υj,µj ,yj
) ∈ ΨI ,∑
j
(
ωjυj +
∑
p pipµ
j
p
)
≤ C , ∑p µjp = µj
}
This discussion implies the following definition of industry inefficiency (IE),
which takes both the number of firms and the allocation of cost across different
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segments as variables of choice:
IDI (y,Ω,Π, C; gy) = sup
β
{β : (y + βgy) ∈ IPI (Ω,Π, C)} (9)
This new definition represents, for a given input price structure and a given
industry cost budget, the overall loss in output when the benchmark is the
industry technology rather than the firm technology. In other words, this defi-
nition is comparing the observed output produced to a benchmark dictated by
the industry technology. If the observed total output and total cost budget of
the industry are inserted in equation (9), the industry inefficiency indicator is
obtained:
IE = IDI (Q,Ω,Π, CI ; gy) (10)
The solution to this problem provides: i) the optimal number of firms that
should populate the industry; ii) the optimal allocation of the total industry cost
across the different segments of the inputs market; iii) the overall inefficiency of
the industry. The inefficiency of the industry is, once again, measured in terms of
the numeraire gy. The definition of industry inefficiency just provided involves
two very different types of inefficiency: on one hand, the inefficiency arising
from a non-optimal allocation of cost across different firms (which includes a
non-optimal number of firms as a special case); on the other hand, a failure to
optimally allocate the overall cost budget across the different segments of the
inputs market. The price effect vanishes if the matrices of prices (Ω,Π) contains
only one element, i.e. in the case in which the law of one price applies.
2.1 Industry inefficiency decomposition.
Given the previous definitions, it is now possible to seek for a decomposition of
the industry inefficiency indicator defined in (10) into its sources components.
The first step in this direction is to consider the impact of the inefficiencies
arising from the firms already operating in the industry. These were defined
in the previous section in equations (3) and (4) and can now be aggregated by
a simple sum across firms (the reader should note how simple aggregation of
directional distance functions is). This is possible because an additive notion of
inefficiency has been used and the numeraire gy is common to all firms. The
industry technical inefficiency is therefore defined as (see Briec et al, 2003; Färe
et al, 2008; Färe and Primont, 2003; Färe and Zelenyuk, 2003):
ITE =
K∑
k=1
D (xk,yk; gy) (11)
Since this is only one part of the total inefficiency of the firm, one should
also aggregate the cost constrained inefficiency into an industry indicator:
ICE =
K∑
k=1
ID (wk/Ck,yk; gy) (12)
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A decomposition of the firm inefficiency was given in the previous section
and it still holds at the industry level, giving rise to an industry allocative
inefficiency indicator:
IAE = ICE − ITE = (13)
=
K∑
k=1
[ID (wk/Ck,yk; gy)−D (xk,yk; gy)]
The difference between the two indicators is a measure of the impact on
industry output loss of non optimal input choices at the firm level. Therefore
overall industry inefficiency can be decomposed as follow:
IE = ITE + IAE + IRE (14)
In this decomposition: the ITE component accounts for the technical in-
efficiency of the firms actually operating in the industry; the IAE component
accounts for the overall effect of the failure to optimize the choice of input
vectors by the firms actually operating in the industry; the IRE component
corresponds to the effect of the potential reallocation of cost across firms and
potential gains obtainable via a reallocation of the industry cost budget across
the different segments of the inputs market. A more direct interpretation of this
result can be obtained by expressing all these quantities in percentage terms:
%ITE + %IAE + %IRE = 1 (15)
where %ITE = ITEIE , %IAE =
IAE
IE , %IRE =
IRE
IE .
2.2 Counter-factual Analysis.
It is interesting to consider the case in which the researcher is interested in
investigating a situation in which input prices change from the observed seg-
mentation (Ω,Π), to a new one say (ΩC ,ΠC) (where the subscript stays for
“counter-factual”). The question now becomes how the industry responds to
such a change. Assuming that the total cost budget of the industry stays un-
changed to the same level, the new optimization problem for the industry is:
IEC = IDI (Q,ΩC ,ΠC , CI ; gy)
It should be noted that it may be the case that IEC < IE and in fact it could
also be negative if counter-factual prices are set to such a level as to make overall
potential production lower than the observed one. This counter-factual analysis
may inform on changes associated with the elimination of subsidies for some
of the production factors in the industry. An example of this counter-factual
analysis is given in the empirical section.
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3 Empirical Illustration
In this section the methodology will be applied to data on 92 electricity distrib-
utors in Ontario, Canada for the year 2011. These data provide information on
3 outputs and 3 inputs. The outputs are: electricity distributed, other products
and services and transmission losses. The inputs are labor (in full time equiv-
alent), capital services and other materials services (intermediate inputs). It is
worth mentioning the inclusion of transmission losses on the output side. This
variable highly correlates with the level of electricity distributed and the trans-
mission losses in the data are of the order of between 1% to 10% of the total
electricity distributed. Prices for inputs were obtained from different sources.
Monthly wage rates and producer and consumer price indexes were obtained
from Statistics Canada. Bond yields on capital (which is a measure of the cost
of capital) were obtained from the Bank of Canada. The remaining data were
extracted from the Yearbooks of Electricity Distributors published by the On-
tario Energy Board (OEB). All price and quantity measures combine to yield
the total revenue, total expenses and earnings before interest and taxes reported
in the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) yearbooks. Figure A1 reports boxplots of
the variables used standardized by the sample mean. It is quite clear from
this picture that the Ontario electricity distribution system show quite a high
degree of heterogeneity on the size of firms, with a few big firms and a large
number of smaller firms. Since the main output produced in the industry is the
electricity distributed, this is reflected in the choice of the directional vector:
gy =
(
1 0 0
)
. This means that the projection involves an expansion of the
quantity of electricity distributed towards the frontier, while keeping the other
outputs constant. This also means that the unit of measurement for the ineffi-
ciency indicators discussed in this section is the same as the unit of measurement
of the electricity distributed. It is unfortunate that data on fixed assets (like
plants and machinery) is not available. If such information was available, it
was possible to specialize our models to a short term perspective in which re-
allocation happens only with the variable factors and the fixed assets are kept
constant. Due to this data limitation, the results presented below should be
interpreted as long run potential gains. In fact, in the long run fixed assets can
be reallocated as well.
Table A1 reports the results for the industry inefficiency decomposition (14).
The total inefficiency of the system is equal to 1.93E+11 KWh of loss in electric-
ity for the given overall cost budget of the industry. The meaning of this figure
is that with the observed overall budget of the industry, if all the inefficiencies
were to be eliminated, that very cost would be able to dispatch almost two times
the quantity of energy that it is currently distributing. In fact by taking the
ratio of actual to potential production gives an inefficiency score of around 0.4,
which means the industry is operating well below its potential. In this table
it is quite clear that 79.3% of this overall inefficiency is given by a reallocation
effect, which implies a transfer of cost across the different firms in the industry
in order to optimally exploit scale and scope economies and bring the number of
firms operating in the industry to the optimal. The remaining 20.7% of the in-
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dustry inefficiency is due to the inefficiency of the firms actually operating in the
industry. According to equation (6) there are two components that induce this
type of inefficiency. The technical inefficiency component (ITE) represents lack
of best practices, while the allocative inefficiency component (IAE) represents a
failure to choose optimal input quantities given the input prices. It is clear from
these figures that the IAE component is the most important component in the
overall firm inefficiency. Summing up, the main component in the inefficiency of
the industry is a reallocation effect and the second most important component
is a failure to optimize with respect to the prevalent input prices.
A more interesting result is the one reported in table A2. Here a counter-
factual analysis is conducted based on the following idea. It is known that there
is a structure of subsidies and regulations in the Ontario electricity distribution
sector which is influencing the choices of the agents operating in it. Without
the ambition of doing any justice to the complexity of the system, here two
anecdotal facts are used to run a counter-factual analysis. The first has to do
with regulation on the cost of capital, with regulation imposing some type of cap
on the return on equity. It is well known that this type of regulation provides
an incentive for manager to expand the capital stock above the optimal level
in order to maintain the correct proportion of return on equity. In other words
this type of regulation implies, de facto, a reduction in the price of capital. The
other anecdotal stylized fact is that worker unions in the energy sector were
able to bargain higher salaries with respect to the average of other sectors, due
to the special structure of subsidies of this sector. This implicitly result in a
higher than average price of labor in the electricity distribution sector. Based on
this anecdotal evidence the counter-factual analysis assumes a scenario in which
wages decline by 10% and the cost of capital increases. Table A2 reports the
results for such an exercise. The table reports input prices and the associated
optimal input quantities. This optimal input quantities are determined as the
best response to the prevailing input prices and are the quantities that should
be chosen by the average firm in order to make the industry operate at its
potential. The table reports how these optimal quantities vary when the input
prices are varied from the observed ones to the counter-factual ones (and the cost
is kept fixed at the observed one). The capital input is the one that shows the
highest percentage reduction (6.5%) followed by labor (6.1%) and intermediate
materials (5.5%). This reduction in optimal input quantities induce a reduction
in the overall potential output of the industry of 6.7%. It is also interesting
to note that the optimal cost shares of the various inputs change dramatically
with the capital share increasing from 14.6% to 22.1% and the share of the other
two inputs declining. It should be noted that the reduction in the output of the
industry is a reduction in the potential output. In fact, since the observed output
is well below this optimal, the reduction induced by the counter-factual could
be offset by an increase in the inudstry efficiency. Therefore a central planner
that would want to relax regulation in the sector could do so, according to
this counter-factual analysis, by providing at the same time stronger incentives
towards efficiency, so that the reduction in the subsidies would not affect the
overall output of the industry.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper a definition of industry inefficiency in cost constrained production
environments is introduced. This definition makes use of the Indirect Direc-
tional Distance Function (IDDF) and quantifies the inefficiency of the industry
in terms of overall output loss for a given overall industry cost budget. The
methodology proposed in this paper identifies the optimal configuration of the
industry and shows how to decompose it into sources components: inefficiencies
arising from sub-optimal configuration of the industry (reallocation inefficiency);
inefficiency arising from a failure to optimize input quantities given the prevalent
inputs prices; inefficiencies due to lack of best practices at the firm level. The
method is illustrated using data on Ontario electricity distributors. The data
shows that lack of best practices is only a minor component of the overall inef-
ficiency of the sector (less than 10%), with reallocation inefficiency accounting
for more than 75% of the overall inefficiency of the system. A counter-factual
analysis based on counter-factual inputs prices is conducted in order to illustrate
how the model can be used to estimate the effects of a change in the regulation
regime.
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Industry Inefficiency Decomposition.
Year IE IRE ICE IAE ITE
Levels 1.93E+11 1.53E+11 4.00E+10 2.80E+10 1.20E+10
Percentage 79.3% 20.7% 14.5% 6.2%
A Tables and Figures
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B APPENDIX: Optimization programs
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the optimization programs associated
with the definitions used in the text in a more explicit way. The firm direct DDF
(3) is obtained solving the following linear program:
D (x,y; gy) = supβ,λ β
s.t. : λX ≤ x′
λY ≥ y′ + βg′y∑
k
λk = 1 (16)
λ ≥ 0
The firm indirect DDF defined in (4) corresponds to the solution of a linear
program, which can be explicitly written as follow:
ID (w/C,y; gy) = supβ,λ,x β
s.t. : λX ≤ x′
λY ≥ y′ + βg′y∑
k
λk = 1 (17)
λ ≥ 0
wx ≤ C
It should be noted that while x is given in equation (16), it is a decision
variable in equation (17). Consider now the partition of the input vector and
input price vector into two components: x =
(
υ µ
)
, W =
(
Ω Π
)
. The
industry inefficiency defined in (10) can be computed using the following mixed
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integer linear program:
IE = supλ,S,ν,µ β
s.t. :
∑
k
λkjυk ≤ υj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
k
λkjµk ≤ µj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
k
λkjyk = yj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
j
yj ≥ Q + βgy∑
k
λkj = Sj (18)
Sj ∈ N
λkj ≥ 0 , ∀k, j∑
j
(
ωjυj +
∑
p
pipµ
j
p
)
≤ C
∑
p
µjp = µj
We note that there are two special cases for which this program can be
greatly simplified. The first one is if we consider the MLMC program of Ray
et al (2008). In this case the only component in the input partition is υ. The
program becomes the following mixed integer linear program:
IE = supλ,S,ν,µ β
s.t. :
∑
k
λkjυk ≤ υj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
k
λkjyk = yj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
j
yj ≥ Q + βgy∑
k
λkj = Sj (19)
Sj ∈ N
λkj ≥ 0 , ∀k, j∑
j
ωjυj ≤ C
Another simplification can be obtained by assuming that the price vector
can be picked independently of the location. In this case we obtain a linear
program with only 1 integer variable. In other words location does not matter
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anymore in this second model. This is a mixed integer linear program (that can
be easily solved using its NLP relaxation):
IE = supλ,S,ν,µ β
s.t. :
∑
k
λkjµk ≤ µj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
k
λkjyk = yj , j = 1, . . . , J∑
j
yj ≥ Q + βgy (20)∑
k
λkj = Sj
λkj ≥ 0 , ∀k, j∑
j
∑
p
pipµ
j
p ≤ C
That definitions (7) and (8) are equivalent can be shown by considering the
sum of S identical firm technology sets:
Ψ + . . .+ Ψ =
 (x,y) : λ1X + . . .+ λSX ≤ x
′
λ1Y + . . .+ λSY ≥ y′∑
s
∑
k λsk = S , λsk ≥ 0 , ∀s, k
 =
=
 (x,y) : (λ1 + . . .+ λS) X ≤ x
′
(λ1 + . . .+ λS) Y ≥ y′∑
s
∑
k λsk = S , λsk ≥ 0 , ∀s, k

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